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Simulations 
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Lab Setup 
Common Constellation: 
Simplistic Setup (unsynchronized) 
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Timing 
 
 
Bunch of different runs: 
- Different speed 
- Different Power 
 
 Location 
Simplistic Setup (unsynchronized) – with RFI 
Depends on Receiver 
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Timing with “knock-out” 
 
 
 
No Pattern 
Explanation 
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Interference forces receiver into 
reacquisition. 
Dependent on search strategy, either 
authentic or fake peak is found first and 
tracked. 
 
 
Synchronization 
Receiver Aspects – Startup, Acquisition 
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- Search strategy (in Acq. or 
Reacq.) in 2D-grid if serial search 
is implemented 
 
- Search method (either serial or 
parallel FFT-based) 
 
- Noise floor estimation at startup 
 
 
 
Receiver Aspects -  Tracking (1) 
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Receiver Aspects -  Tracking (2) 
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Effect of loop parametration on spoofing sync (peaks overlap!) 
Feasibility Issues (1) 
www.DLR.de  •  Chart 9 > Spoofing at Startup > M. Appel  •  WGC Maspalomas > April 2018 
- Since no synchronization is necessary, feasibility is given by using 
commercial hardware 
- Either signal simulators or SDR Platforms will be enough (software on 
Github) 
 
 
 
 
- Very unlikely that correlation functions overlap, i.e. only one peak per PRN 
will be tracked. 
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A. Broumandan, A. Jafarnia Jahromi, S. Daneshmand, and L. Gérard, “GNSS 
Vulnerability to Spoofing Threats and  a Review of Anti-Spoofing Techniques,” 
presented at the ION Alberta Meeting, Alberta?, 24-Jan-2014. 
 
Feasibility Issues (2) 
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Issue: Power calibration of spoofer to match nominal power 
 
 
 
Easier (for spoofer) if farer away! 
 
 
 
Possible Occurrences 
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Every time the victim is “parked” and navigation is turned on or restarted  
Examples: 
- Airport 
- Parked train, train passing  tunnel 
- Harbor 
 
 
 
If mix is found/tracked: Allows for ARAIM based detection 
Questions to the group 
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- How does this fit in the current threat model? (see threat_notes_v0.9) 
- Are ARAIM methods (would be a link to the other subgroup) useful? Which 
ones? 
- How to deal with receiver implementation aspects? 
- Possible defend strategies? 
 
Countermeasure proposals: 
- Second peak constant search/acquisition 
- Second peak tracking if overlapped 
- Recommendation for loop implementation (Tobias Bamberg) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
